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HOPI. George C. Prm: 
Professor Zablotsky has emphasized what has always been a 
major part of the litigation process, that is, the inherent interac- 
tion between substance and procedure. When he began to discuss 
the burden of proof regarding misuse, whether it should be a part 
of the defendant's affirmative defense or plaintiff's prima facie 
case,l I made a note to compare that with the disaster that the 
courts have made out of shifting burdens in the employment 
discrimination area. Soon afterwards, he turned around and used 
that very same example to prove how right he was. I only hope, 
as this area moves ahead in the law, that we do not get into the 
handling of a prima facie case, defendant's burden, and plain- 
tiff's burden. The burden shifts at this point, in the same way that 
the employment discrimination area has shifted. What we have 
done is taken what were originally trial concepts and moved them 
back into the litigation process. In other words, like everything 
1. See Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, 495 A.2d 348,354-55 (hld. 1985); 
Christopher H. Toll, 7he Burden of Proving Misuse in Products Liability 
Cases, 20 COLO. LAW. 2307, 2308-11 (1991) (noting that "strict liability 
focuses on the product rather than on the manufacturer's conduct," unlike in 
negligence); see also Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc, 670 P.2d 
113, 116 (N.M. 1983) (stating that "[d]efendants have the burden of proving 
[their] affirmative defenses. . ." and that misuse is one of those "defenses 
previously allowed to be raised in [that] jurisdiction . . . ."); Kirklad v. 
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974) (suggesting that 
misuse may "as a matter of proof be an affirmative matter . . . ."); Jackson v. 
Standard Oil Co., 505 P.2d 139, 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that 
misuse is an affirmative defense and the burden falls on defendant). But see 
Schwartz v. American Honda Motor Co., 710 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(stating that "[the] absence of misuse is part of plaintiffs proof of an 
unreasonably dangerous condition or of proximate cause. . . ."); Hughes v. 
Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542,548 (Iowa 1980) (holding that "misuse is 
not to be treated in jury instructions as an affirmative defense . . ." but rather 
the "burden of proof [is] on [the plaintiffJ . . . ."); Rogers v. Tom Mfg. Co., 
522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that misuse "is not 
properly a defense but a necessary element of plaintiff's cause of 
action. . . ."). 
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else, we have turned the trial concept into motions and rules of 
law. It is a field day for defense lawyers. A defendant can win on 
a motion and need not have to face a jury at all with anything that 
can be made a rule of law. 
In the products liability area, where there is sufficient facts in 
the affidavits to make out a prima facie case, but it has failed to 
have been shown, the defendant still has to go forward. The de- 
fendant must establish or articulate some legitimate, non-dis- 
criminatory reason for what was done. If a defendant could es- 
tablish such reason, then the burden would go back to the plain- 
tiff, or maybe it was always on the plaintiff from the beginning. 
These issues are resolved, not in the context of a trial, but in the 
context of motions and this generates a lot of paper and a lot of 
billing for clients. 
I have noted from experience that when it comes down to the 
ultimate question like plaintiff misuse, defective product, or 
comparative negligence, when you try to charge a jury so it can 
understand the law, it does not give two hoots about burden of 
proof. Both sides have presented evidence as to what happened. 
Now the jury has to decide from that evidence what really hap- 
pened and how it will apportion responsibility. I cannot imagine 
that any jury would say, "well, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proof and has established it to the extent of forty-eight and a half 
percent, and on the other side the defendant has established the 
following percentages, and so on." Rather, it will simply come to 
a conclusion. It looks at the whole thing and says so much here, 
SO much there, "let's go home." 
Professor James Henderson: 
I have always wanted the "law of the jungle"2 to return. First, 
let me tell Professor Zablotsky, and the rest of you, how the 
Committee thinks it will handle misuse.3 I had not planned to di- 
2. "As usually understood . . . the law of the jungle is the Inw of might 
over right." THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, AND FAMOUS 
PHRASES 1368 (Burton Stevenson ed. 1948). 
3. See generally 6 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF 
TORTS 9 18: 158 (1989). The authors stated: 
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vulge as much of this as I have, and the rest of the Committee is 
going to get me for it, but here I go. I will not show the draft, 
but I will say that it does not have misuse as a separate doctrine 
nor will it exist anywhere else in the law; we are blasting it to the 
moon. Let me tell you what is going to take place. I do not think 
it will upset you as much as you might expect. Additionally, I 
would distinguish between the burden of production4 and the 
burden of persuasion.5 The burden of persuasion will be on the 
plaintiff in the revised section 402A. However, as I wrote when I 
was untenured at Boston University, as a practical matter, the 
burden of production or the proximate causation issue should be 
on the defendant.6 If the plaintiff can show but-for cause and ef- 
Misuse has been variously defined as a use of a product not intended 
andlor not reasonably foreseeable; a use of a product for an abnormal 
purpose; a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could 
not reasonable have expected a product to be designed and manufactured 
to withstand it-a use that the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and 
provide for; or a use of the product that constitutes willful or reckless 
misconduct or an invitation of injury. Moreover, product misuse m y  
consist of a change in design so that the product is not in the same 
condition as it was in when it was manufactured. 
Id 
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 196 (6th ed. 1990). The burden of 
production is: 
The obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a 
ruling against him on the issue. . . . Such burden is met when one with 
the burden of proof has introduced sufficient evidence to make out a 
prima facie case, though the cogency of the evidence m y  fall short of 
convincing the trier of fact to find for him. The burden of introducing 
some evidence on all the required elements of the crime or tort or 
contract to avoid the direction of a verdict against the party with the 
burden of p m f .  
Id. 
5. Id The burden of persuasion is when "the onus [is] on the party with 
the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact of all elements of his case." 
Id 
6. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the lime Dimension in 
Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919,955 (1981): 
The plaintiff should. . . be required to show that the purchaser's 
commitment to the old technology was the proximte cause of his 
injury. The recovery should be denied when the defendant shows that a 
cost-effective switch to the newer, safer technology was available to, 
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fect, which a plaintiff can do in most of the cases that are bother- 
some, then it is the defendant that has to bring in proof to refute 
causation. 
This result was beyond the risk, which is the way Prosser ex- 
plained ii in his treati~e.~ He cited two cases, each in which a 
child drowned in a swimming p l  without a lifeguard.8 The re- 
spective families brought lawsuits which asked, as their main le- 
gal questions, whether their respective children would have 
drowned if there had been a lifeguard on duty.9 Prosser said, 
practically speaking, that the defendants ought to have the burden 
of suggesting, based on credible evidence, that a lifeguard would 
have saved the child.1° Put differently, there should be a pre- 
sumption which favors the plaintiffs on the second proximate 
cause issue about the lifeguard saving the drowning child. Thus, 
when the plaintiff has proven breach, causation, and affirmative 
defenses, the defendant should have a one fourth bite at the ap- 
ple. The Committee is making this very explicit in the comments 
of the revision and in the reporter's notes. 
Moving right along, I want to chastise Professor Madden for 
his statement about the Washington case, Ayers v. Johnson & 
Johnson Baby Products Co. l1 He mentioned the ingestion of 
and refused by, the person in control of the product when the risk 
avoidance measures became available. 
7. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS. 
8. See id. at 8 41, at 270 n.55 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Rovegno v. San Jose 
Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 291 P.2d 848 (Cal. 1930) (holding that it is 
a matter of speculation for the jury as to what would have happened had a 
lifeguard been present) and R.A. Blacka v. James, 139 S.E.2d 47, 50 (Va. 
1964) (holding that "[tlhe negligence of the defendant must have a causal 
connection with the drowning, and in the absence of a showing that a 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the death there can be no 
recovery. . . .")). 
9. Rovegno, 291 P.2d at 849; R.A. Blacka, 139 S.E.2d at 48. 
10. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 270. 
11. 797 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1990). The Ayers court reasoned that the 
manufacturer of baby oil, who did not place a warning on the label about the 
oil being dangerous if inhaled into a person's lungs, could be found liable 
based on failure to warn if the family testified that they would have kept the 
baby oil out of reach had such a warning been included. Id. at 529. 
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baby oil, implying to some of you that the baby "chug-a-luggedn 
a pint of the stuff and went brain dead. I will briefly discuss the 
facts of this case. Laurie Ayers, the older sister of 5-year-old 
toddler David Ayers, put some baby oil in a little bottle in her 
purse, which she intended to rub on her hands after gym class.12 
She left the purse on the floor in her bedroom.13 David found the 
purse, opened it, and took out the bottle of baby oil.14 Just as 
David began to drink the baby oil, his mother entered the room15 
and yelled at David to stop.16 Because he was startled, the child 
may have inhaled quickly and sucked the baby oil into his 
lungs. l7 Mrs. Ayers was relieved when she realized it was baby 
oil.18 She thought the only effect would be diarrhea.19 She read 
the bottle and there was no warning.20 She told her two other 
children to call her at work if David seemed to be getting ill.21 
When a person sucks any oil or viscous fluid into his or her 
lungs, that person cannot breathe.22 The person appears to be 
breathing, but the air is not getting through the capillaries to the 
body.23 However, the person will not collapse immediately.24 
12. Id 
13. Id 
14. Id 
15. Id 
16. Id 
17. Id. 
18. Id 
19. Id 
20. Id 
21. Id 
22. See J.C. Cunningham et al., Lipoid Pnewnonia Secondary to Baby Oil 
Aspiration: A Case Report and Rerfew of the Literature, PEDIA'IRIC 
EMERGENCY CARE, June 1985, at 76. 
The severity of the acute phase of the condition, progressive 
deterioration, and compromised oxygenation of the patient can b 
explained on the basis of pathophysiologic changes in airways, alveoli, 
and interstitial tissues produced by the oil. These changes, which nre 
responsible for a ventilation-perfhion imbalance and d e e r 4  lung 
compliance, resulted in severe hypoxemia and prolonged need for 
supplemental oxygen. 
Id 
23. Id 
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It was not until later that evening when the child was having 
trouble breathing that the family rushed him to the hospital.25 
There is a special machine for the purpose of cleaning the inside 
of lungs when viscous fluid gets into them.26 The hospital tried 
to clear out his lungs, however the child suffered severe and 
permanent side effects.27 This heartbroken family brought an ac- 
tion against Johnson & Johnson, the manufacturer of the baby 
oil. 28 
In this case there is neither a long latency problem29 nor a limit 
of knowledge problem.30 The hospital had a machine to clean the 
lungs.31 In my view, the legal problem was that Johnson & John- 
24. Paul M. Wax, Hydrocarbons, it1 EMERGENCY MEDICINE A 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY GUIDE 601, 602 (Judith E. Tintinally et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 1992) ("Most fatalities from these complications occur within 24 
h[ours] . "). 
25. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529. 
26. Id. This procedure is called ECMO therapy. It is a "special procedure 
that involves pumping the patient's blood outside his body and mechmically 
enriching it with oxygen." Id. 
27. Id. David suffered "cardiac arrest" which "led to brain damage. David 
cannot now move his arms or legs, cannot speak, suffers seizures, and is 
mentally retarded. " Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Amy B. Blumenberg, lhe  Periodic Payment of Future Medical 
Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 
(1992). "The latency period is the time between exposure and the appearance 
of symptoms." Id. at 668 n.32. Certain injuries such as toxic tort injuries go 
undetected for years due to long latency periods during which time the ailment 
cannot be "clinically diagnosed." Id. at 661. As a result of a long latency 
period, a victim who has been exposed to a toxic substance may not bring an 
action until termination of the latency period. Id. In Ayers, the parents learned 
of the baby's ingestion of the baby oil within several hours; therefore, no long 
latency problem existed in this case. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529. 
30. See 5 SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 018.25, at 685- 
86 (1988) (In certain cases a manufacturer has no duty to warn if the 
"product's dangerous propensity" was unknown and incapable of being known 
based on "the present state of human knowledge."). There is no limit of 
knowledge problem here because the dangers associated with the ingestion of 
mineral oil are known. "One of the most serious of mineral oils properties is 
its capacity to destroy the process by which lungs rid themselves of foreign 
materials. " Ayers, 797 P.2d at 532. 
3 1. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529. 
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son did not have a warning on the bottle of baby oil which would 
have informed the mother that ingestion of this substance would 
be dangerous.32 The mother testified at trial that if there had been 
a warning on the bottle of baby oil by the company that she 
would have kept it out of reach of her chiidren.33 However, the 
problem with the argument, from a proximate cause standpoint, 
is that the sister intervened.34 Therefore, an action of failure to 
warn will not be successful. 
These cases do not arise very often and will not put companies 
out of business.35 My estimate is that this type of situation prob- 
ably occurs, in major cities, twelve times a year. Additionally, 
there are strange types of medical emergencies that occur, ones 
that are surprising. For example, there is a machine in most 
emergency rooms which is designed to take pool balls out of 
mouths. No kidding. In bars, after people have had a few beers, 
they make bets like, "I bet I can put this pool ball in my mouth." 
When the ball gets into the mouth, the jaws clench up and the 
ball gets stuck. It happens often enough in New York City that 
there is a machine which removes the ball from the mouth. FQith- 
out this machine, in order to remove the ball, the teeth have to be 
pulled. 
What happened to the child in Ayers was not only foreseeable, 
the industry, itself, saw it coming.36 If the company had checked 
32. Id at 530. In fact, that was the problem. The court stated h t  
'because the product was without a warning, the family members did not 
know it was dangerous and so did not treat it as such." Id. 
33. Id 
34. Id 
35. Id at 533 (Reed, J., dissenting) ('Beyond cavil, the risk in this case 
was exceedingly remote: from 1932 to the time of the accideat in 1985, 
Johnson & Johnson had sold over 500 million bottles of baby oil without a 
single report of aspiration."). 
36. Id at 532. Johnson & Johnson knew that if baby oil was inhaled the 
result would be serious. The court stated: 
One of the most serious of mineral oil's properties is its capacity to 
destroy the process by which the lungs rid themselves of foreign 
particles. Cells called macrophages surround a foreign substance in the 
lung whether it is milk, water, oil, or some solid substance, md cnrrp, it 
away from the lungs. The Ayerses produced testimony b d  on the 
literature concerning oils in the lungs that showed these mncrophnges 
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the records, it would have known that children do inhale baby 
oil, not with regularity, but it is not a once-in-a-lifetime occur- 
rence. What was not foreseeable were all the facts of failure to 
w m . 3 7  
cannot rid the lungs of oil. While the macrophages initially surround the 
oil, they cannot absorb it. The macrophages give up and release the oil 
back into the lungs. Given this potential for serious harm, the burden on 
Johnson & Johnson, essentially the cost of printing and affixing a 
warning label, seems light indeed. 
Id. The analysis by the court culminated with the conclusion that it was a 
foreseeable risk for Johnson & Johnson. The court stated: 
First the focus is on the product, and the question is whether the 
product is 'not reasonably safe.' The answer is found by balancing the 
likelihood that the product would cause the harm complained of (and the 
seriousness of that harm must be taken into account here) against the 
burden on the manufacturer in providing an adequate warning. In this 
case, that balancing involves the following factors: the product is called 
baby oil; it is for use on babies; it is described as 'pure and gentle'; and 
it bears a label suggestion that it be used on baby's scalp, which, of 
course is near both the mouth and nose. Although it may be unlikely 
that the product will cause harm of the gravity experienced here, 
nevertheless the seriousness of the risk is extremely great considering 
what mineral oil can do when aspirated. 
Id. The court then considered, as a second step for the foreseeability question, 
"whether the product was unsafe beyond the expectations of the ordinary 
consumer." Id. The court stated that it believed: 
[Olnly two factors need be considered in a failure to warn case: (1) 
nature of the product, and (2) deficiency of the warning. Here, the 
product was composed of an oil that has the potential for great harm if it 
gets into the lungs, but is nevertheless promoted for use on and around 
babies. The warning was not merely deficient, it was nonexistent. 
Id. at 532-33. 
37. This statement reflects the view of the dissent. The dissent framed the 
problem by stating: 
Was the likelihood of aspiration together with the gravity of the harm 
sufficient to impose a duty on the defendant to guard against that 
danger? . . . I would hold that the risk of harm in this case was 
insufficient to impose a duty upon Johnson & Johnson [to include my  
warning about the dangers of aspiration]. 
Id. at 535-36 (Reed, J., dissenting); see aho  Michael S. Jacobs, Toward A 
Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 127 
(1992) ("The conventional formulation of failure-to-warn law requires that a 
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When I teach this case in class, I look around the room. The 
students know that I am a middle-of-the-roader, and I say that the 
facts in Ayen do not show a defective design.38 We do not want 
the companies to redesign baby oil to make it safe to breathe in 
your lungs. However, I think this defers on kind of a social in- 
surance basis. This will not put the company down. 
There are other cases where children ingest. What is your reac- 
tion to this situation? A child is eating a sandwich at supper. It is 
buttered on one side and there is peanut butter on the other side. 
He is young enough that all of a sudden the peanut butter gets 
stuck in his throat. He does a number, sort of like the plaintiff in 
~ y e r s . 3 9  Well, when the grief stricken mother comes in she 
claims she should have been warned about the danger of the pea- 
nut butter. Does this mean that there needs to be a warning on 
peanut butter jars? 
Professor M. Smrt Madden: 
I appreciate the facts in Ayers. That is surely true. However, I 
had not meant to cite Ayers as an example of a case that fell into 
manufacturer provide consumers with an adequate warning of risks associated 
with the use of its product."). 
38. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7 ,  $99, at 698-99: 
Much of the difficulty related to products liability litigation centers 
around the meaning of defect in the kind of way that makes n product 
unreasonably dangerous in relation to design hnzards. There are 
essentially two different approaches that have k e n  utilized in evaluating 
design hazards - a consumer-purchaser or consumer-user contemplation 
test and a risk-utility test. . . . Under the consumercontemplation 
test. . . a product is defectively dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased 
it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community os to the 
product's characteristics . . . . Under [the danger-utility test], n product 
is defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger out- 
weighs the utility of the product. 
Id. 
39. See supra notes 11-36 and accompanying text. 
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the category for which I proposed a reverse of strict products li- 
ability.40 
Professor James Henderson: 
Everything about the accident in Ayers was scientifically know- 
able, but who would have thought the child would swallow the 
baby oil? I do not want to clutter baby oil bottles with warnings 
like "do not let your child breathe this in." 
Hoa. George C. Pratt: 
Does the audience have any questions? 
Audience Member: 
Baby oil is a baby product that is going to be in a baby's room, 
nursery, or bathroom. Most baby products do have a label like 
"do not ingest," "do not let baby ingest," or "not for oral con- 
sumption." Baby oil should have some warning on it. 
Professor James Henderson: 
Then what about causation? I am pro-plaintiff in this instance 
with all of you, alright? This type of lawsuit will not put Johnson 
& Johnson out of business because a situation like this happens so 
rarely. Additionally, are you going to call it a flaw? It is not a 
technical flaw, and at most it may have been a mismatch of prod- 
uct and user in a tragic way. I cannot believe that if there was a 
40. See generally M. Stuart Madden, Sectiorr 402A: "Don't l'hrow the 
Baby Out With the Bathwater" 10 Tou~o  L. REV. 123 (1993). The author 
stated: 
For products that cause long latency personal physical injuries, 
by . . . ingestion, [or] inhalation . . . elimination of the state-of-the-art 
defense or the state of scientific knowledge defense, and imposition of 
true strict tort liability, would preserve the progress of section 402A 
where anything less would not adequately protect injured individuals 
Id. at 147. 
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warning on the baby oil bottle saying "do not let baby ingest," 
that Mrs. Ayers would have either not bought the baby oil or 
would have put it in a secret place like it was poison. Addition- 
ally, Laurie put it in her p ~ r s e . ~ l  Would she have known about 
the warning anyway?42 
Audience Member: 
The bottle of baby oil should say "call a paramedic or poison 
control if ingested." Most baby products do say "call poison 
control or a paramedic immediately if ingested." 
Professor James Henderson: 
The other argument which could have been made by the plain- 
tiffs in Ayers was a post-trauma argument, which is different 
from a pre-trauma warning which would initially prevent the 
children from going near the prod~ct.4~ The plaintiffs could have 
argued that the company could have added a warning to bottles of 
baby oil stating that if the consumer has any reason to think a 
child has ingested it, to seek immediate medical attention. You 
see, the plaintiffs sat around all afternoon and into the evening 
with no idea that there was any risk to their child other than diar- 
rhea.4$ There is a time of sale decision and a post-trauma deci- 
sion. That post-trauma branch of failure to warn is one which I 
think would have been successful in Ayers. 
41. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529. 
42. Id at 530. The court stated that Mrs. Ayers testified that "she was a 
label reader and that had she known of the risks of aspiration, everyone else in 
the family would have known also." Id Mr. Ayers testified that "products 
known to be dangerous were kept up on a top shelf out of reach [and that if 
the] product carried a warning of the risks, they would not have had it in the 
house." Id In fact, Laurie testified that "Mrs. Ayers told all the family 
members to keep items known to be dangerous away From David]." Id. 
43. Id The Ayerses argued that they would have either put the baby oil 
out of reach or not bought it at all if there had k e n  a warning on the label 
which stated the risks which resulted to their son David. Id. 
4. Zd at 529. 
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Professor M. Stuart Madden: 
The antidote syndrome. 
Audience Membep: 
In the case you are talking about, how often does the oil go 
into the lungs, as opposed to going into the stomach? Was that a 
rare occurrence? 
Professor James Henderson: 
To be honest, if you had one hundred children, each with a lit- 
tle bottle of baby oil, and each child put the bottle in his mouth, 
ninety-nine point nine percent of the time the baby oil would go 
into the st0mach.4~ There has to be perfect timix1g.4~ The child 
has a bottle to his lips, the mother screams at him, and then the 
child sucks it up and boom. It could not be replicated if you 
tried, and it would be a gruesome experiment. 
Audience Member: 
This is not foreseeable and this would not be foreseeable. 
45. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 75 (presenting aspiration of bnby 
oil as an unusual cause of acute respiratory distress in children); Wax, supra 
note 24, at 601 ("Viscosity is measured in Saybolt Seconds Universnl (SSU). 
Patients ingesting substances with viscosities less than 60 SSU are at grenter 
risk for aspiration than those ingesting substances with viscosities greater thnn 
100 SSU. "); Anthony J. Scalzo et al., Extracorporeul Membrane Oxygenation 
for Hydrocarbon Aspiration, AM. J .  DISEASES OF CHILDREN, Aug. 1990, at 
867 ("A 15-month-old male infant who aspirated baby oil (light mineral oil) is 
particularly unusual owing to the generally expected low risk of aspiration 
with a hydrocarbon of such viscosity ([greater than] 60 Saybolt Universnl 
Seconds). "). 
46. See generally Scalm et al., supra note 44. 
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Professor James Henderson: 
That is the point. I agree with Professor Madden. \Ve are not 
far apart on this, but I disagree with him for citing Ayers for the 
proposition of an unknowable risk. 
Audience Member: 
One more thing. You are talking about social insurance. I get 
the feeling you are saying that, because the companies are able to 
afford it, we should shift this cost onto them. Is that what you are 
saying? 
Professor James Henderson: 
There are more reasons than that. When you tell me there is an 
unknowable risk, whether it is either a risk related to the use of 
drugs or toxins, then I see a picture where companies cannot in- 
sue. However, what will occur after the fact is that the compa- 
nies will be dismantled and will pay only ten cents on the dollar 
to the victims. One hundred cents on the dollar will be paid to the 
first few plaintiffs that get a reward and nothing else to the rest. 
This puts the company down. However, it will not, in my view, 
insure. 
If I were the corporate counsel and there was such a rule, I 
would begin to organize companies with subsidiaries to handle 
the risky stuff. However, it would be difficult for drug compa- 
nies to do that because they would not know which drug would 
be the next disaster. Maybe I should get out of the business of 
counseling corporations, but there are ways around it. 
Audience Membzr: 
I can see how, in the scenario you have given us, product mis- 
use would be inappropriate and unfair. You were equitable to the 
plaintiff. Would product misuse be appropriate in a situation 
where a defendant who uses a car battery to power some small 
toy, electrocutes himself! 
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Professor James Henderson: 
You are talking about a car battery he is using to what? 
Audience Member: 
For something other than putting it in a car. 
Professor James Henderson: 
I would first ask myself, "is the battery defective because it can 
do this?" Should there be a warning against this? If there should 
be a warning, then, the next consideration should be proximate 
cause. After that, there is the consideration of but-for causa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The defendant must persuade the judge that there is 
enough evidence to make out a prima facie case and get to the 
jury.48 If misuse is used as an independent defense, my sense is 
that some courts will be lured into going all the way through the 
trial, and the plaintiff will succeed, and now what about this new 
defense? It is four bites at three apples. 
Hon. George C. Pratt: 
In the interest of ultimately bringing this to a conclusion, I 
would like to invite each panel member, in turn, for any final 
comments they might have. Mr. Crofton, I will start with you. 
Do you have anything you wish to add to what has been said? 
47. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, 9 41, at 266 ("[Under the 'but for' 
rule] [tlhe defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not 
have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not 
a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it."). 
48. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 269-70 ("The plaintiff must introduce 
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more 
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the 
result . . . . The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. "). 
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Michael CroBon, Esq. : 
I would just like to second what Professor Henderson had to 
say about the social insurance question,49 and I think this is 
something that needs to be clearly understood. The questioner in 
the back raised the issue. 
Ultimately, and I have indicated this during my talk, somebody 
has got to pay the price of giving coverage in circumstances 
where it just does not make sense to impose coverage or compen- 
sation responsibilities on insurance companies and corporations. 
When Professor Henderson mentioned you get ten cents on the 
dollar, that is essentially what has occurred in certain circum- 
stances today. ~ohns-~anvillsO and the various Dalkon Shield 
cases51 have let the solvency of major corporations go.52 What 
49. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: l3e Limits of 
Tort as Social Insurance, 10 Tou~o L. REV. 107, 119-20 (1993). Professor 
Henderson feels that the tort system does not work as a a i a l  insurance system 
as it is more pro-lawyer than pro-consumer. He feels that payments are made 
on a "random, unfair, speculative basis," and that costs should be contained by 
lowering the price of insurance. Id. 
50. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (26 Cu. 
1992) (class action complaint seeking review of obligation payment procedures 
under settlement trust created pursuant to the Johns-Mmville Corporation's 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 
1556 (Fed. Ci. 1988) (action by asbestos manuhchmr seeking 
indemnification from United States for liability to shipyard workers exposed to 
United Shtes sold asbestos), cerf. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); MacArthur 
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.) (movement by 
manufacturer for approval of proposed settlement with insurers and for order 
enjoining all  future suits against insurers pertaining to settled policies), cerf. 
aknied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); In re Johns-hfanville Corp., 40 B.R. 219 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy court's order of automntic stay 
prohibiting a codefendant of the Johns-hfanville Corporation from obtaining 
pre-trial discovery documents for its own use in suits from which debtor wns 
severed); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 32 B.R. 728 (Bankr. S.D.M.Y. 1983) 
(holding that hct  that debtor petitioned for Chapter 11 does not per se prohibit 
debtor from lobbying for proposed legislation for resolving damage claims of 
asbestos litigants). 
51. See In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cu. 1988) (allowing 
class certification and settlement where products liability plaintiff brought 
action against manufacturer's insurer as joint tortf-r), cert. denied sub 
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you have got is the residual matter of unprotected groups. At that 
point, society has got to bite the bullet and say, "Are we going to 
make the compensation of certain injured consumers a matter of 
general taxpayer responsibility?" Of course, once you start doing 
that, you throw the question into the political arena and the 
democratic process must make the decision as to how much we 
care about these people. What Professor Henderson was saying is 
that if you are a Hillary Clinton supporter, you would like to see 
society bite the bullet and pay the cost for that type of coverage. 
If, however, you chose not to go that route, and say the tort 
system must provide coverage in every circumstance, you must 
understand some realities. That is, the tort system is extremely 
inefficient in the way it utilizes dollars to compensate people.53 
nom., Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989); 
Hawkinson v. A. H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984) 
(consolidated action for injuries resulting from use of Dalkon Shield 
manufactured by defendant); Lebeda v. A. H. Robins Co., 101 F.R.D. 689 
(D. Me. 1984) (suit brought against defendant under various theories of 
liability, such as negligence and strict liability, for injuries resulting from use 
of the Dalkon Shield); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shieldn IUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (permitting suit by 
thousands of women injured by allegedly defective Dalkon Shield), vtlcated, 
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 
(Colo. 1984) (approving jury award of $6.2 million in punitive damages to 
woman harmed by Dalkon Shield). 
52. On August 21, 1985, A. H. Robins Co., the manufacturer of the 
Dalkon Shield, filed a petition for re-organization relief under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. $9 1101-1 174 (1988). For an explanation of 
the details surrounding the bankruptcy proceedings, see In re A. H. Robins 
Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988). Furthermore, Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company, A. H. Robins' insurance company, had to d e  "'$70,000,000.00 
available to Robins beyond the face value of the Aetna policies'" to cover 
Robins' debts. In re A. H. Robins Co., 846 F.2d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 1988). 
Additionally, the Johns-Manville Corporation, the world's largest 
manufacturer of asbestos, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 on August 26, 1982, as a result of claims from current and future 
injuries estimated at two billion dollars. For a full explanation of the 
proceedings, see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lkig., 982 F.2d 721. See 
also Robert Rice, Reinsurers Reelingji-om Red-Line Entries, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 
15, 1993, at 6 (noting the bankruptcies of Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins). 
53. See Tillinghast, Tort Cost Trenrls: An International Perspective 8 
(1992). The Tillinghast survey is an update of prior surveys done on the 
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Out of each dollar the tort system costs in the United States, the 
defense bar gets eighteen cents.54 Plaintiffs' bar gets fifteen 
cents,55 various other costs are twenty-four cents,56 and the 
plaintiff gets forty-three cents.57 It is a ridiculous way to use 
money to compensate people. It just does not make any sense. I 
am trying to give you a flavor of what we are talking about, 
whereas a properly run social insurance system that puts myself 
and plaintiffs' lawyers out of business can actually end up giving 
the plaintiffs ninety or eighty-five cents on the dollar. That is a 
vast improvement. Therefore, I endorse what Professor Hender- 
son said in that regard.58 
HOPI. George C. Prm: 
Professor Phillips, do you have any comment? 
United States tort system. The survey e n c o m p m  the years 1933 through 
1991. The key findings of the survey include: the United States tort system 
cost $132 billion in 1991; in the past 58 years tort costs have risen four times 
fastet than the United States economy; the United States tort system is the most 
expensive in the industrialized world; and, "[wlhen viewed as a method of 
compensating claimants, the U.S. tort system is highly inefficient, returning 
less than 50 cents on the dollar to the people it is designed to help . . . ." Id. at 
3; see also Donald P.  Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk 
Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 127 (1993) (stating that a national h d t h  insurance 
system "might prove preferable to the current system's dependency on the 
vagaries of the private liability insurance market. . . and the inefficient and 
unequally allocated. . . insurance systemn); Robert Sugarmnn, Doing Awqy 
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 591-96 (1985) (criticizing the current 
tort compensation system for its arbitrariness, its excessive compensation to 
certain victims, as well as its failure to compensate altogether, or under 
compensate, victims of certain torts). 
54. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8. 
55. Tilliighast, supra note 53, at 8. 
56. Tilliighast, supra note 53, at 8. 
57. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8. 
58. See Henderson, supra note 49. 
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Professor Jerry Phillips: 
In general, I would like to make one comment, and it is a 
question to  Professor Henderson. Going back to the consumer 
expectation test, which I think, on the whole, works better than 
the risk-utility test as the standard informed by presumed seller 
knowledge. This test has been criticized because the consumer 
has no expectation of safety for obvious dangers.59 I do not think 
that is true, particularly since we have eliminated obvious dan- 
gers as a bar to recovery as a matter of law in the New York 
case, Micallef v. Miehle C O . ~ O  A consumer certainly expects the 
product to be safe and to be usable in the workplace, even though 
he knows he is confronted with danger everyday. In many of the 
complicated design cases, the consumer has no expectation until 
he is informed by expert testimony.61 This is exactly the same as 
in a negligence case. The negligence jury, which represents the 
ordinary consumer or the ordinary reasonable person, has no ex- 
pectation of what a doctor, for example, can do, until it is in- 
formed by expert testimony.62 Likewise, in consumer product 
59. See Bat& v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 F.2d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding that "an open and obvious danger to an ordinnry user precludes 
recovery against product manufacturer under negligence and strict liability in 
tort."); Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 975 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that if product defects were open and obvious, then plnintiff is barred 
from recovery); Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 
208, 214 (Mich. 1992) (stating that there is no duty to warn of product risks 
that are open and obvious). 
60. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573, 348 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 
(1976) (stating that "[tlhe time has come to depart from the patent danger 
rule . . . ."). 
61. See generally Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 
1034 (Or. 1974). At least one court has suggested that a "knowledgeable seller 
test" be substituted for the consumer expectations test under such 
circumstances. Id. The court in Phillips defined a dangerously defective 
product as "one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of 
commerce if he had knowledge of its hannful character. " Id. nt 1036 
(emphasis in original). 
62. Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248, 250 (Ga. 1993) (stating thnt in 
medical malpractice actions, plaintiff must present expert testimony so thnt 
jury can determine acceptable professional conduct); Benison v. Silverman, 
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cases, the jury can also be informed by the testimony of ex- 
perts.63 
As Professor Twerski mentioned again this morning, Professor 
Henderson spoke about the area of conscious design decision as 
an area in which the courts and the juries should practice a hands- 
off policy. If we have the time, and if you care to reply, Profes- 
sor Henderson, I would be curious to hear you explain what your 
position is on the conscious design decision today, and how it 
should be treated in products law. 
Professor James Henderson: 
In 1973, just as strict products liability began to be used in de- 
sign defect cases, I wrote an article in the Columbia Law Re- 
viav,64 urging courts to stay away from such ~ases.~5 The only 
type of cases which I thought were worthy of review were what I 
called "inadvertent design cases."66 Those are similar to the case 
599 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ill. App. 3d 1992) (explaining that expert testimony 
is needed in "malpractice because jurors are not skilled in the pnctice of 
medicine"); Fabio v. Bellomo, No. C6-91-2542, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 558, at 
*8 (Aug. 20, 1993) (stating that in medical malpractice action, plaintiff must 
present expert testimony to establish standard of care applicable to defendant). 
63. Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that for technical aspects of case, expert testimony was n e a s a y  to 
assist jury in reaching its decision) (citing Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 
F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
64. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' 
Conscious Design Choices: l%e Limits of Aa'judicaion, 73 CO~uhi. L. REV. 
1531 (1973). 
65. Id. "[A] significant problem area. . . in products liability 
law. . . involves the judicial handling of cases concerning conscious design 
choice." Id. at 1552. "Courts should resist the pressures to adjudicate the 
reasonableness of conscious design choices, and give in only in those few cases 
where the polycentricity of the question can be narrowed and n judicial 
resolution appears preferable to no solution at dl." Id. at 1577. 
66. Id at 1548-52. Inadvertent design errors are errors where the design 
engineers inadvertently fail to "appreciate adequately the implications of the 
various elements of [the] design, or to employ commonly understood md 
universally accepted engineering techniques to achieve the ends intended 
without regard to the product." Id. at 1548. These cases are worthy of review 
Heinonline - -  10 Touro L. Rev. 229 1993-1994 
230 TOUR0 LAW REWEW [Vol 10 
that Mr. Vargo discussed which involved the handlebar.67 The 
product in that case did not do what it was intended to do.68 At 
first it seemed like it was a flaw. That is why I said, when he 
asked me what type of defect it was, that it did not matter. The 
cases I label conscious design choice cases are the ones where the 
product did what it was intended to d0.~9 The question is, should 
it have done more? They are the difficult design cases. 
While I was indeed very skeptical of the use of judicial inter- 
vention in product design cases, in 1979, I wrote an article in the 
Minnesota Law ~eview~O where I began to embrace that idea.71 
The new Restatement is certainly going to embrace that whole- 
heartedly. 
because all that must be done in determining liability is to "determin[e] what 
caused the products to fail in the first place." Id. at 1552. 
67. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700 (Md. 
1981). The plaintiff bought a motorcycle ana "[tlhe alleged defect. . . was 
stated as an improper assembly of the throttle control clamp causing a clamp 
screw to suddenly fracture. This, it [wals contended, permitted the throttle 
control mechanism to come off the handlebar while the appellee was opemting 
his motorcycle." Id. at 703. 
68. Id. at 703-04. 
69. See Henderson, supra note 64, at 1549 (These design choices are 
"consciously intended and, for that reason, the risks that they generate are not 
so likely to interfere directly with the products' intended functions. Most often 
the risks of harm are associated with other unintended patterns of use. "). 
70. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over 
Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging 
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1978-79). 
71. See Henderson, supra note 70, at 806 ("[Tlhe gradual formulation of a 
consensus favoring cost-benefit analysis [by judges] has been accompanied in 
some jurisdictions by a lamentable tendency of courts to routinely address 
problems beyond their inherent competence. "). 
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Hon. George C. Prait: 
Mr. Vargo, do you have anything to add? 
Mr. John Vargo, Esq. : 
Very well. I started all of this. I agree with Stuart Madden, 
Jerry Phillips, Oscar Gray and Peter Zablotsky. Thank you. 
Professor Oscar S. Gray: 
I agree with a great deal of what has been said by my col- 
leagues. I am very much encouraged, in particular, by much that 
Professors Twerski and Henderson have said regarding the 
changes that will be forthcoming, as stated in the proposed revi- 
sion that was published in the Cornell Law ~ e v i e w . ~ ~  Until I see 
those changes, I cannot really comment on them, but I expect I 
should agree with a good number of them. 
I also agree with a great deal that was said by Professors Mad- 
den and Phillips. However, I must insert one nit-pick with regard 
to Professor Phillips' remarks. I do not think it is quite fair to say 
that the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) has taken a particular 
position on items that are discussed in the recent Reporters' Study 
on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (Reporters' 
The fact of the matter is that the A.L.I. went to con- 
--- - - - - 
72. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 7he Proposed Revision 
of Section 4024 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORMELL . REV. 
1512 (1992). 
73. A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RES~NSIBW FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY (1991) bereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY]. The Reporters' 
Study was presented to the American Law Institute five years after the A.L.I. 
endorsed such study to examine the steep increases in products liability 
insurance. 1 Id. at 3-7. The Reporters' Study was limited to personal injuries 
"that [arose] out of product use, medical treatment, the workplace, and toxic 
exposures in the environment." 1 Id. at 7. The recommendations were 
formulated to address "substantive rules of liability governing these 
activities;. . . p d u r e s  through which liability and cornpeaation are 
determined;" insurance, both public and private; and legislative and 
administrative regulation of risk designated activities. 1 Id. at xi. 
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siderable lengths to distance itself from that Reporters' ~ t u d y , ~ 4  
and there is nothing in that study that represents the views of the 
A . L . I . ~ ~  
Furthermore, as I indicated earlier, I tend to agree with Profes- 
sor Henderson's position that it is not desirable to have legal 
rules that force many socially responsible businesses out of busi- 
n e ~ s . ~ 6  If it were true that there were extensive hazards that are 
~ninsurable,~~ I think that would be an important matter for con- 
cern. 
I have been teaching insurance law for a number of years. 
There is a great deal about insurance that I do not understand, as 
there is a great deal about torts that I do not understand. How- 
ever, as I suggested earlier, I have suspected that unforeseeable 
hazards are in fact i n s ~ r a b l e , ~ ~  and I was impressed by Mr. 
74. In the forward of the Reporters' Study, Geoffrey Hazard, the Director 
of the American Law Institute, explained the Council's divergent views on the 
merits of some of the proposals, specifically that the Council had taken no 
position on the study as a whole or on its particular proposals. 1 Id. at xii. 
75. The special status of the report was isrther emphasizd by a note 
attached to the inside cover which stated: 
This Reporters' Study has been published under a provision of the 
Institute's Bylaws that authorizes the Council to publish documents even 
though their contents have not been approved by the Council or the 
membership. As stated in the legend on the title page, the contents do 
not represent the position of the Institute. 
76. Seesupra pp. 218-19. 
77. See George L. Priest, i'he Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1542-43 (1987). The author provides a general 
discussion of how the insurance system operates. He describes insurers as 
agents of risk diversification who must identify risks that are independent 
(uncorrelated) and aggregate them in order to reduce the total risk of the set. In 
describing the effects of insurers attempts to exploit the "law of large 
numbers," by spreading the risks efficiently throughout the insured 
population, he emphasizes the problems faced by members of the risk pool 
when such risks are not independent. Id. at 1539-43. "[The alggregation of 
such risks would be unproductive because the reserves of the insurer would 
have to maintain would equal, or perhaps, exceed the reserves individuals 
would have to maintain if uninsured . . . this is why society-wide calamities, 
such as nuclear war are uninsurable." Id. at 1543. 
78. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, m e  Anti- 
Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Busitresses 
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Crofton's suggestion that this is the case.79 Professor Hender- 
son's rebuttal of that serves as further evidence that he is at his 
strongest when he places a law and economics analysis behind 
himg0 I do not believe the issue is resolved by developing nar- 
row definitions of insurance.81 Nor do I think it is consistent to 
have insurance policies available today, containing normal limi- 
tations, such as deductibles or ceilings on liability, while not ex- 
cluding unforeseeable risks. 82 
I do not know what the limits are of insurance that can be sold, 
but I suspect, based on what Mr. Crofton has said, that unfore- 
seeable risks continue to be covered at a price.83 Furthermore, 
we do not have a widespread problem of manufacturers going out 
of business due to their net worth being reduced by product li- 
Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & COM. 167, 182 (1989) (reporting 
that unforeseeable risks are insurable at dramatically increased premiums). 
79. See Michael Crofton, From a Defense Attorney's Perspective.- 'Ihere 
Is No Free Lunch, " 10 T o u ~ o  L. REV. 57,58 (1993). 
80. See Henderson, supra note 49. 
81. See W. Kip Viscusi, Ihe Performance of Liability Insurance in Stales 
with D~xerent Product Liability Statutes, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 809, 816-20 
(1990). The author suggests that state statutes that limit product liability 
definitions may reduce ambiguity once courts have interpreted the statutes, 
however, until courts interpret the statutes, the ambiguous definitions 
contribute to the unaffordability and unavailability of insumce. Id. at 816. 
Furthermore, the author suggests the narrow definitions 
provide a consistently more profitable context for product risk 
insurance. It would be an oversimplification to conclude that it is the 
definitions themselves driving this result. Because such definitions tend 
to be an integral part of the statutory treatment of liability, n more 
reasonable interpretation is that the definitions variable serves as a 
proxy for statutory provisions that, on balance, foster a more profitable 
environment for the insurer. 
Id. at 820; @. Priest, supra note 77, at 1548 (arguing that injured consumers 
are benefited by narrow definitions of risk pools, because such definitions 
increase "product sales, [since] the premium added to the price of the product 
more closely approximates the consumer's expected loss . . . ."). 
82. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985). 
83. See Crofton, supra note 79. 
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ability claims to ten cents on the dollar.s4 It has not happened in 
any industry that I know of in the United States, with the excep- 
tion of asbestos85 and Dalkon Shieldg6 cases. However, those are 
not cases of innocent producers.87 Those are cases where what 
happened to the companies was richly deserved by those compa- 
nies. The notion that there is something economically distorted 
about having insurance that is sold by underwriters who are tak- 
ing a gamble, and therefore padding the price because they are 
84. See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODU(XS LIABILITY 214 (1991) 
(suggesting that courts "are sending firms price signals that in effect enable 
them to pay ten cents on the dollar for the economic value of the lives that will 
be lost as a result of product risks . . . ."); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass 
Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 870 (1984) (suggesting that courts' "proper 
payout ratio could vary from [ten] cents on every [one dollar] claimed to a 
full, dollar-fordollar payout . . . . "). 
85. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 
(N.J. 1982) (permitting recovery for injuries and wrongful deaths from the 
manufacturer of a knowable risk of asbestos exposure). See Michael A. 
Hiltzik, New York's Rules Seen Among Most Restrictive in Manville Case: 
State Laws Bar Some Asbestosis Victims j7om Legal Relief, L. A. TIM=, Nov. 
4, 1985, 9 IV at 1. In 1985, approximately 35,000 people injured by asbestos 
exposure had filed suits against Johns-Manville causing it to file for Chapter 
11 and reorganize by "establish[ing] a claims fund financed by up to 80% of 
its stock and $75 million annually from its profits." Id. 
86. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); A.H. 
Robins Co., v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 
(1986); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 
1210 (Kan. 1987). 
87. See Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, l3e Historical Continuity of 
Punitive Damages Awarh: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1269, 131 1 (1993). The authors report that "[tlwo hundred thousand persons 
will die from asbestos-related diseases by the end of the twentieth century. 
Many of these deaths have resulted from asbestos manufacturers' active 
concealment of the dangers of unprotected exposure." Id. at 131 1 (footnotes 
omitted). In a study conducted by the authors regarding products liability cases 
from 1965 to 1990, they found that "[tlhe majority of plaintiffs in these cases 
were permanently or partially disabled as a result of the corporation not having 
taken prompt remedial measures." Id. 131 1-12. See also Tetuan v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (finding Dalkon Shield 
company intentionally concealed test results that product was unsafe, paid 
money for favorable test results and marketed product with the knowledge of 
its dangers). 
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taking a gamble,88 is something that is not self-evident. I think 
you need to know more about what the numbers are before you 
are able to come to a conclusion. I do not know what the num- 
bers are, therefore I have not come to a conclusion. 
I would like to expand on a point that Professor Henderson 
confirmed at lunch today. For some time, studies have indicated 
that a terrible burden exists on manufacturers due to products li- 
ability. Nevertheless, the cost of products liability, which is rep- 
resented by the cost of products liability insurance, runs at ap- 
proximately one percent of total manufacturing costs across the 
board.89 For example, in an industry with unusual hazards, un- 
derwriters may sell insurance at a highly padded premium in or- 
der to cover uncertainties. As Professor Henderson suggested, the 
underwriters pad by approximately a factor of ten.90 If the cost 
of manufacturing products increases by nine percentage points, 
representing the diierence between insurance costs selling at one 
percent of normal manufacturing costs and padding insurance by 
a factor of ten, it is self-evident that you have a terrible result in 
continuing to protect the consumer who is injured by a product 
that was defective. 
Moreover, I think the discussion regarding social insurancegl is 
a red herring. I recognize there are many more preferable ways 
88. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 
1306 (9th Cir. 1987). In Clougherry, the court stated "[ilnsurance involves 
transferring from the insured to the insurer the consequences of a possible 
future event. The likelihood that a loss will occur is of uncertain but 
predictable magnitude; the size of loss is similarly uncertain but predictable." 
Id. 
89. See generally U.S. GEN. A c ~ .  OFF., L ~ A B I L ~  INSURANCE: 
E m s  OF RECENT "CRISIS" ON BUSINESSES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 32 
(July 28, 1988) ("On average, as a percentage of annual gross receipts, s d l  
businesses spent 1.0 percent on liability coverage for policy years 1985 and 
1.2 percent for 1986."). 
90. Seesupra p. 221. 
91. Social insurance is defined as: 
A comprehensive welfare plan established by law, generally compulsory 
in nature, and based on a program which spreads the cost of benefits 
among the entire population rather than on individual recipients. The 
federal government began to use social insurance prognms in 1935 with 
the passage of the Social Security Act. The basic federal and state 
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than lawsuits for paying consumers' hospital bills and the like.92 
If our society is prepared to implement alternative social safety 
nets, I shall welcome them. If alternatives were implemented, 
they would significantly impact tort law. In the absence of having 
those safety net institutions, it seems fair to me to evaluate the 
care and rehabilitation of accident victims and the protection of 
their families through tort law. 
Finally, I suggest that much of what you hear, regarding the 
inefficiency of tort as a method of compensating accident victims, 
is exaggerated. The numbers pertaining to the supposed cost of 
tort compensation tend to reflect the inefficiency, not of tort as 
such, but of negligence law in particular. You are talking about 
the expense of the waste that is involved in worrying about risk- 
benefit analysis and otherwise disputing the existence of negli- 
gence. Tort law need not be that expensive if you have a strict li- 
ability system. 
Hon. George C. Pratt: 
Professor Henderson, you asked to have a moment rebuttal. 
Professor James Henderson: 
I will just make two remarks. One, I think it is one percent of 
the gross domestic product, not the manufacturer's costs. Two, I 
spent the first day and a half in my insurance course, Professor 
approaches to social insurance presently in use are: Old Age, Survivors 
and Disability Insurance (i.e. social security); Medicare and Medicaid; 
unemployment insurance; and worker's compensation. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 806 (6th ed. 1990). 
92. See generally 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 73, at 181-202 
(discussing current programs of social insurance and possible alternatives to 
obviate the tort compensation system); Jeffrey O'Connell, Alterrtatives to the 
Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17 (1986) 
(suggesting, as  alternatives to social insurance, a statute providing defendants 
with a choice between litigation or periodic payments, different insurance 
policy or product warranty binding seller to compensate victims for economic 
losses). 
Heinonline - -  10 Touro L. Rev. 236 1993-1994 
PANEL DZSCUSSION 
Gray, working through a hypothetical to develop the distinction 
between insurance and gambling. 
Professor Peter Mlotsky: 
I am pleased that the discussion of misuse and a few other re- 
marks prompted Professor Henderson to disclose a few secrets. 
At the same time, I want to reassure you, speaking for the Touro 
Law Review, the symposium issue will not be out in the next 
three weeks, and your secrets are completely safe with us, so 
thank you. Just one point. I still think that the ultimate and o p  
erative issue is whether the cumulative effect of the proposed 
components of the product liability causes of action will be per- 
ceived as shifting the theories of liability. I think if we can agree 
on that, we will have consensus. If not, that is where the discord 
will arise. Thank you. 
Hon. George C. Pratt: 
I think that you should be aware, if you are not already, that 
Professor Zablotsky is the one responsible for this entire sympo- 
sium. Peter, you deserve a great deal of credit for assembling a 
panel of such experience, knowledge and ability. For me, at 
least, this has been a mind stretching experience. I think I have 
bridged ten years in the circuit court. On behalf of the law 
school, let me thank all the members of the panel for putting 
aside many important things in coming here today and participat- 
ing in the discussion. We hope that it has been as worthwhile to 
you as it has been to us. 
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